- Oct 02, 2018
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aydreeihn authored
This commit ensures that we will always get the correct attachment name regardless of if the file content is the same. Additionally, it ensures that the file_ids for attachments are compared in the correct order (elseifs)
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- Oct 01, 2018
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aydreeihn authored
This commit ensures that we will always get the correct attachment name regardless of if the file content is the same. Additionally, it ensures that the file_ids for attachments are compared in the correct order (elseifs)
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- Mar 22, 2018
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Peter Rotich authored
Commit c4579277 introduced an extra administrative security feature to restrict files access to signed in users only, even if a user has a valid & signed download URL. The feature, however, did not take into account public images & files associated with FAQs and pages such as landing/thank-you pages. This commit addresses the shortcoming by adding a reference ID (attachment ID) to the download/access URL, that can be used to deduce the model/object type that the file request is associated with. The technique will allow us in the future to enforce ACL at the file level depending on privacy settings and the security clearance of the user (agent).
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- Sep 14, 2017
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Peter Rotich authored
This commit addresses an SQL injection vulnerability in ORM lookup function. * ORM implementation failed to properly quote fields, used in SQL statements, that might originate from unsanitized user input. * AttachmentFile lookup allowed for key based SQL injection by blindly delegating non-string lookup to ORM.
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- Oct 24, 2016
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Peter Rotich authored
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- Apr 24, 2016
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Jared Hancock authored
This feature adds a setting to the control panel to require signing in to view attachments. This is in addition to the security already provided in the download URLs. Currently, download URLs are signed for a specific help desk, and automatically expire after about 24 hours. The exact timing is the following midnight allowing for at least 12 hours cache time. Administrators can impose this extra security feature to refuse serving attachment files if the user is not currently signed in. This could prevent third-party users from viewing an attachment if they were able to get access to the download URL before it expired.
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- May 13, 2015
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Jared Hancock authored
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- Jan 06, 2015
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Jared Hancock authored
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- Dec 31, 2014
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Jared Hancock authored
This script adds a single download script, 'file.php', which provides access to files of all types to all users. It uses a HMAC signature system with an expires time, which allows signed URLs to be sent to external users. This also fixes an issue with the Http::cacheable() method, where the last-modified and Etag headers were not properly compared, which resulted in permanent cache misses by the client.
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